1.
. us they will need to have an important role in stabilising CO 2 concentrations in the atmosphere and bal climate. However, with limited responsibility for historic emissions, pressing short term elopment ntries is likely to be continge ject based approaches, like t issions reductions on a project by project basis. It may be difficult to scale-up these approaches in er to achieve sufficient coverage of all sectors. Difficulties also arise in successfully extending such echanism to a sufficient number of small projects. Emissions reductions, or a move towards lowbon growth, are therefore likely to require domestic policy initiatives. Developing countries might willing to engage in such domestic policy initiatives, if they are not accompanied by high economic political costs and do not undermine the countries ability to address pressing socio-economic and al environmental needs.
e Bali road map created a link between action by developing countries and technology transfer, ancing and capacity building by industrialised countries. It requires both parties to make their tribution in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner. This raises questions about what sons we can learn from previous cooperation between countries on suitable ways to structure joint tigation and adaptation efforts. both industrialised and developing countries need to make measurable, reportable and verifiable tributions, all parties have the opportunity to make their cooperation conditional on the observed tribution of the other parties. We do not aim to discuss how such conditionality will work in the a of climate policy, but want to co ir evaluation in academic and policy literature. We hope this can inspire new ideas and constructive cussion. nditionality has previously been used in various settings -among them development assistance m the World Bank or the IMF, bilateral development cooperation, or EU enlargement. Ta   6 ). At the same time, conditionality in the EU enlargement process is frequently acknowledged as effective policy instrument (Ederveen et al. 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004) . Some earch on EU conditionality has also included reference to World Bank and IMF conditionality heckel 2000; Ederveen et al. 2006) , however this is less so vice versa. is paper assesses the implementation and verification of conditionality based on a literature survey the performance of these programs. Conditionality frequently evokes negative associations. These y result from an institutional setting that is perceived as inequitable, or from policy objectives that subject to debate. For example, the policy measures that were requested by the World F from developing countries were frequently seen as overriding national sovereignty and thereby ermining ownership. In addition they were associated with negative short-term effects such as employment and reduced social benefits. However, this paper does not assess the validity of such icy objectives, or the extent to which the policy instruments required by conditionality can deliver desired objectives, instead it focuses on the mechanisms of conditionality.
ble 1 provides a qualitative summary of evaluations of conditionality provisions within the rature. The level of compliance associated with the conditionality requirement, i.e. whether the ipient country implemented the required policy, is higher when the response in the case of nonpliance is more credible. For example, the IMF is somewhat more stringent than the World Bank reducing loans and transfers if conditionality requirements are not met. This may explain why F is seen to be more successful in realizing the implementation of agreed policies.
ndidate EU Member States are likely to be more persistent in implementing conditionality uirements, as compliance results in the benefits of membership. Also the compliance mechanism is engthened by the European Commission and existing Member States' motivation to ensure the egrity of the institutional set up of the EU is not threatened by non-compliance. In contrast, bilateral elopment cooperation seems to be less successful in realizing the implementation of agreed icies by recipient countries. This is possibly due to the ability of recipient countries to 'choose' ween several donor countries, allowing recipients to avoid unilateral conditionality requirements. In ition, the reluctance of donor countries to reduce transfers for health or poverty reduction programs its their ability to respond in the case of non-compliance. Furthermore bilateral donors frequently tinue programs despite non-compliance because their strategic geopolitical interest and historic ndship outweigh the importance of credibility in the conditionality mechanism. bilateral approach creates the risk that countries abandon the cooperation prematurely and engage th other countries. This can result in less compliance of both parties and can reduce the effectiveness the cooperation. This suggests the need for some process that results in a 'twinning' of countries so to strengthen the links.
periences from IMF and World Bank conditionality suggest that a lack of shared ownership of jects and policies reduces their effectiveness and persistence. Ownership can be achieved during formulation of con e limited experience with climate policy and may have other priorities, cooperative climate policy achieve ownership more successfully by building on country-specific requirements. An emphasis policies with climate co-benefits may be more appealing to developing countries due to the portance of other national priorities. nsparent monitoring of compliance enhances the credibility of conditionality mechanisms. Clearly ined indicators are a particularly important component of successful mechanisms, as is the titutional framework for the monitoring and evaluating of conditionality provisions. World Bank erience suggests that if staff evaluate their own overestimate programme achievements. This highlights the importance of an independent nitoring and review body. An international framework for such monitoring may be preferable as it uces the risk of 'implicit conditionality', for example requirements for the use of specific hnologies produced by the partner country, or the pursuit of wider geopolitical interest. the programs analysed, conditionality can be formulated with ex-ante requirements that must be isfied before any financial transfer is received. An alternative formulation makes continued support endent on sustained compliance with conditionality requirements (ex-post). So far ex-ante ditionality has proved more effective.
operative climate policy could for example provide financial support for the costs associated with cific climate or energy policies, for policies with climate co-benefits, or for the achievement of re specific climate or energy indicators. Thus cooperative climate policy could create links between licies or indicators and financial payments, thereby encouraging policy implementation. A condition for success is the ability of the recipient country to implement climate and energy licies. Cooperative climate policy must therefore take into account a country's institutional capacity climate policy -and in some cases provide suppor tance.
e credibility of any such conditionality depends on the stringency of the response in case of nonpliance. This has often proved to be missing -particularly in bilateral development aid projectse to the 'Samaritan dilemma' or the geo-strategic interests of donor countries. In the first case, ors struggle to respond to non-compliance because they want to continue aid and health care vision. Responding to non-compliance is also impeded when discontinuities threaten the success of roject or program. For the design of cooperative climate policy, this suggests that it would be more ficult to limit financial support that is dedicated to aid projects if they have strong social ponents.
case of EU enlargement, enforcement was more credible because existing Member States had a ted interest in the compliance of new member countries due to their own involvement in the EU. ilarly, climate conditionality may be more successful than traditional development cooperation ause the self-interest of industrialised countries in facilitating emissions reductions may be higher therefore result in more consistent implementation of the cooperative climate policy. Also from perspective of developing countries, it is possibly easier to participate in climate agreements that tain incentive-based provisions if they share the objectives of the programs.
e institutional setting appears to have a strong impact on the potential success of a conditionality chanism. Essentially, the institutional setting of a cooperative climate policy can either be bilateral, ltilateral, or comp 
The framework of conditionality
In the described as a 'principal-agent framework', which fol as wh pri "ex o things they wouldn't otherwise do or to do things more quickly than they would choose to do" (Killick 2005b, p1).
Th
y is essential to the ownership and suc alysed, conditionality requirements reduce the level of ownership of An tho neg Co str Th po through the 4 ns included in the initial formulation of the agreement or by gradual extension of the scope of mate policy provisions. Such bilateral cooperation thus benefits from a multilateral framework that ates transparency and clear rules to define the scope of the conditionality agreement and enables nsparent monitoring to ensure the cooperation is focused on policies with climate (co-) benefits.
contrast, bilateral formulations of cooperative climate policy can also offer benefits. It allows for an roach that is better tailored to the national circumstances of a country than a purely multilateral ting that has to be globally harmonised. This type of duality might also enhance the level of ountability on both sides, as the partners may feel more responsible for their partner country than in more 'anonymous' multilateral setting. It is also not clear whether the detailed expertise and erience required for cooperation and capacity building is available at sufficient scale in ernational institutions. Bilateral cooperation could directly link institutions at the national or subional level. This may lead to a wider engagement of partner countries and ensure ownership by al stakeholders and thus enhance policy persistency and accountability on both sides. Due to the stantially larger number of developing countries compared to the number of industrialised ntries, this would result in the need for every industrialised country to enter into a bilateral deal th a group of developing countries.
is paper provides an initial attempt to understand the role conditionality provisions could play thin cooperative climate policy, and as such does not claim to offer solutions to the current blems of conditionality mechanisms. The paper aims to explore some of the possible characteristics climate policy cooperation. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework of conditionality. ctions 3 to 6 review conditionality provisions applied by the IMF, the World Bank, bilateral elopment assistance, and EU enlargement. Sec section 8 concludes with a checklist of important design aspects for cooperative climate policy.
General framework
nditionality has been used in a growing number of programmes and plans -the most prominent ong them being conditionality tied to loans by the IMF or the World Bank. Conditionality has also n applied in bilateral development aid programs, and in different processes of European integration om NATO expansion to EU enlargement. past the concept of conditionality has been lows the concept of neo-realism from political science. Killick (1997) puts the underlying question follows: "the essential problem is how principals (in the present case, donors) can design contracts ich embody rewards that make it in the interests of agents (recipient governments) to further the ncipals´ objectives" (p487). In this framework conditionality can also be understood as the ercise of financial leverage, requiring governments to d is formulation faces an inherent dichotomy: country sovereignt cessful implementation of programs; however, in the settings an programs by recipient countries.
alternative perspective on conditionality is offered by the theory of 'social learning'. Constructivist ught, also based in the political science literature, expands on the role of dialogue, persuasion and otiation in the strategic behaviour exhibited by human and state action (Checkel 2001) . nditionality can offer the basis for such a dialogue, as is suggested by the use of a mix of soft and ong policy instruments.
ese perspectives may fall short of explaining cooperative climate policy, where conditionality could ssibly be a tool to align mutual responsibilities. Cooperation can, however, be understood principal-agent framework, which suggests that the principal could at the same time be an agent - Ba ality by the IMF, the World Bank, bilateral donors, and the European Union, an overview of the effectiveness of conditionality in these different contexts is pre bri for 5 sented in the next section. The review is structured as follows: First the conditionality program is efly introduced with its motivation and history. Then cases of compliance with conditionality mulated by the mechanism are analysed. Next the reaction in case of non-compliance is discussed 5b). e conditionality mechanism is also defined by its institutional setting, e.g. bilateral development peration between two countries, or multi-lateral bodies like the IMF or the World Bank acting as nter parties trade-off between efficiency and inclusiveness of programmes is frequently observed. Selectivity of peration partners may lead to more efficient outcomes but may exclude many partners from gram participation. The Millennium Challenge Account of the United States is an example of ditionality that strongly favours efficiency ove titutional aspects.
2 Implementation nditionality can be designed in different approaches: ex-ante, ex-post, desired action conditionality, a mixture of these approac plementation and monitoring of c mediate links between the success o sired actions". Lastly, in the programs analysed, a mixture of these forms is common: preditions must be met before financial transfers or accession negotiations start, and trigger conditions e to be fulfilled during the programme to enable the next tranche of financial transfers or to move the next step of accession negotiations. Programmes are often accompanied by less-binding policy visions.
e differences between "negative conditionality" and "positive conditionality" are sometimes hlighted (Rich 2004, 326f) . Negative conditionality punishes the failure to meet conditions; in the e of cooperative climate policy for example by industrialized countries interrupting transfers or by eloping countries stopping emissions reduction policies. Positive conditionality creates incentives meet conditions by rewarding good performance, for example by supplying additional support. plicit conditionality can be observed where there is an understanding that future funding of projects ends on their current performance.
y of programs is frequently cited as an important requirement for their successful plementation. As for the conditional aid system, discontinuities create uncertainties that promise successful implementation of reform (Adam et al. 2004; ChristianAid 2006; Collier et al. 7; Eurodad 2006,) .
Results / Success
nditionality has become a much debated topic. Criticism of conditionality emerged mainly in the F and World Bank context. These criticisms plicit paternalism of conditionality, as well as to the objectives of conditionality. Program plementation has also been criticised due to the formalism and multiplicity of conditions. It is ued that these problems, in combination with a lack of coordination between donors, resulted in a k of ownership of reforms by recipient countries. World Bank offer and also the most xamples of inancial system by uch credits were rder to ensure that ality requirements
The IMF the most fa debated tionality. When founded in 1944, the IMF focused on stabilising the pos iding short-term balance of payment credits to mpanied by conditionality on monetary, fiscal, and exchange rat would be able to recover its loans (Buira 2003). ribed monetary and fiscal targets, but countries we 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 7 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 5 worldwide economic and debt crisis during the 1980s was particularly severe for developing ntries. This led to the emergence of structural conditionality in the form of Structural Adjustment grams (SAPs), which were believed, by the IMF and the World Bank, to be a panacea for eloping countries. The IMF and the World Bank intensified and harmonized their cooperation lowing the lines of the "Washington Consensus": conditions no longer focused on macro-economic iables, but also on supply-side and institutional issues like government taxation, expenditure plans, our markets, deregulation of the economy, and privatisation (Killick 1997, p484) . 
3.
An IMF conditionality has generally been rather weak. Dreher (2004) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . Programmes between 1999 and 2001 included a total number of twentye conditions, nine of them performance conditions. e last year an industrialised country applied for an IMF loan was 1976, at about the same time vate money ceased to be readily available for developing countries. Dreher (2004) argues that both tors contributed to the increase in conditionality.
Compliance with conditionality
alysis by a range of researchers suggests that compliance with es have been around 50% and below for credit ceilings or over 4. Compliance in the following years ranged between 30% an ior actions" (ex-ante conditionality) was significantly higher at 80% in the same period. (All: eher 2004).
llick (1997) finds that IMF loans have "decisive and sustained influence" on the exchange rate and orm of other price variables, such as interest rates, agricultural producer prices, and the deregulation consumer prices (p486). They do, however, have less influence on institutional change, for mple, in financial sector reforms and privatization programmes.
Reaction in
case of non-compliance, IMF programmes are interrupted or ended. Mussa and Savastano (1999) died 615 IMF programs over the period of 1973 to 1997. They found that more than a third of IMF angements ended with disbursements of less than half of the initially agreed support, and that in ly 43%-49% of analysed cases 75% or more of the negotiated sum was dis wever, new programmes are also concluded for political reasons whe nality of previous programmes is evident (Dreher 2002) . "A process akdown and subsequent renegotiation seems to be accepted by the Fund as an integral part of its ationship with client countries" (Bird 2002, p838) .
Achievement of policy objectives
e question of the effect act of aid, with the majority focusing on the impact of aid flows on GDP growth and other croeconomic variables, such as investment or public consumption. These studies implicitly refer to notion that aid is meant to bridge the savings-investment gap that poor countries face. Although objectives for IMF lending and other donors include poverty reduction, less research has been ducted on the impact of foreign aid on poverty reduction (Mosley et al. 2004 ).
nificantly positive effects face heavy methodological criticisms. In imate the counterfactual -what would have happened in the "significant link between IMF involvement and increases in growth and income" (Meltzer 2000, ). 
4.

Conditionality applied by the World Bank
e World Bank offers loans to developing countries for infrastructure or sector projects but requires eptance of the conditionality clauses that are attached to these loans.
unded alongside the IMF in 1944, the World Bank's objective was to promote long k was mostly financing investment in roads and dams. Conditionality was applie ure an economic environment that would allow repayment. World Bank conditi ilar to that of the IMF (Killick 1997).
mentioned earlier, the debt crisis in the 1980s led to structural adjustment lending by both the IMF the World Bank. As a result the focus of World Bank conditionality shifted ernational trade and the fiscal sector, then to the financial sector, privatisation and institutional orm. The conditions applied by the two Bretton Woods Institutions tended to overlap, leading to biguity in their specific roles, and increasing pressure on recipient countries. sponding to rising critique on structural adjustment lending, in the 1990s the conditionality uirements included requirements of 'good governance'. For the World Bank, this translated into und development management' -i.e. effective, predictab icient accounting, and a binding legal framework for private sector competition. While the statutes the World Bank and the IMF prohibit tying development aid to specific political conditions, ateral programmes frequently contain explicit political conditionality including aspects of human hts and democracy.
tially the World Bank used fewer conditions than the IMF. The move from structural adjustment ding to 'good governance' requirements, has led to a substantial increase in the number ditions applied by the World Bank. 
Compliance with conditionality
Dr ividual conditionality provisions. In the ation, 60% of conditions have been implemented. Dollar and Svensson (2000) show that, for a data set of 220 World Bank adjustment loa Op wi nu com Co ov 58 var
Reaction in case of non-compliance
The main response of the World Bank in cases where conditionality requirements are not met appears to be delayed assistance. Killick (1997) finds that "on average, adjustment programmes take twice as long to complete as intended, largely because of non-implementation of policy conditions" (p486). How conti ear 100%: "the funds are in the end released irres 0 struc k between a country's reform effort, fulfilment of conditionality, and the disbursement of loans. Easterly (2003) criticises that "the success of past aid to follow conditions and the failure of past aid to follow con eher (2002) ever, even though about 50% of programmes were seriously delayed (Killick 1997), in cases of nued non-compliance disbursement rates are n pective of performance" (World Bank 2005a, BP5, p9) . Through the analysis of more than 20 tural adjustment programmes, Svensson (2003) comes to similar conclusion, that there is no lin ditions are both taken as justifications for future aid" (p38).
It has been suggested that non-compliance may even go hand in hand with additional resource inputs by the World Bank: Dollar and Svensson (2000) urces to the failed programmes. Once a bad loan is made, there is a tendency to put a lot of ources into salvaging it, and our evidence shows that this is fruitless" (p896). Furthermore, the rld Bank has not responded consistently to large economic policy changes with increased finance vision (Collier, Dollar 2004) .
Achievement of policy objectives
e initial policy objective of World Ban plemented by poverty reduction in the 1990s. However, there is dispute abou rld Bank aid on growth. Hansen and Tarp (2000) analysed 131 cross-c vey that assessed the effectiveness of foreign aid, drawing the co ect on the growth rate. Prominent studies by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 1998) 
Conditionality applied to bilateral aid flows
e condition rld Bank. Donor countries offer loans for infrastructure or sector projects, or as budget support. cipient countries accept the conditionality clauses that the donors attach to these loans.
ile many publications assess multilateral aid flows, less research assesses bilateral relationships lbervik 1999). Since the 1980s, bilateral development aid usually ties programmes to IMF and rld Bank conditionality provisions ('cross-conditionality'). F itional provisions relating to human rights, the rule of law, and democracy (Killick Dollar (1998) argue that bilateral aid flows are related to economic and strategic in ies 3 . Conditionality for bilateral aid differs in each donor-recipient-relationshipventing a general interpretation. Examples below illustrate the diversity of approaches. icial development aid from the United Kingdom, as analysed by Erswell for the period from 1974-0, was characterised by continuity irrespective of achievement of official aid policy goals like environmental protection (Erswell 1994) . While the majority of aid used to require ipients to spend aid money on products or services from the donor country, this changed with no re UK aid being tied since 2001 (OECD 2001 . France "has given overwhelmingly to its former colonies" irrespective of conditions, whilst the United States' pat the U.S. has targeted about on , p33). The authors also find that there is generally a reward for democratisation in a country (Alesina, Dollar 2000).
Hu cou im 11 man rights are part of the political conditionality of most bilateral aid. There has been some crossntry research to establish to what extent respect for human rights in recipient countries has an pact on the volume of aid they receive. Neumayer (2003a; 2003b) argues that respect for political management and accountability (DFID 2005) . Conditionality incorporates these objectives is complemented by macroeconomic policy assessments. Although direct conditionality in IMF anced programmes was used to facilitate macroeconomic stability, this intervention was formally sed with the introduction of the new policy (Mokoro 2005).
other example of bilateral aid conditionality, and one of the few examples of ex-post conditionality, he recent US aid program Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The program was announced in 2 and formally started in 2004. The MCA is operated by the newly created Millennium Challenge rporation (MCC) and has a strong selection process for candidate countries. I stablishes quantifiable performance criteria to determine country eligibility and makes both that a, and the selection methodology, publicly available (Herrling 2007). The concept is based on the umption that aid will be more effective when given to well-governed countries and that these ntries will respond to such rewards by pursuing sound policies. Certain preconditions concerning political, social and economic environment have to be met by a country to become eligible to mit a compact proposal to the MCC board. 
Compliance with Conditionality
r UK aid, there is no transparent monitoring for compliance with conditionality currently in place. koro (2005) argues that a set of targets has been formulated but it does not directly impact bursement or conditions for disbursement because of the absence of a clear link between indicators resources. Therefore DFID expand? is aiming for a better monitoring of the conditions that it uld indicate a breach of the program. This is despite the fact licy choices on partner governments, but rather aims to monitor partner govern far 25 countries are eligible for funding from the Millennium Challenge Account. By satisfying the formance indicators, the countries have complied with the program's ex-ante conditionality uirements. 15 countries have already signed contracts and 21 countries are eligible for "Threshold nding" which will help them to meet the selection criteria (MCC 2007).
Reaction in case of non-compliance
rld Bank funding and cross country studies for bilateral aid both demonstrate that the difference ween committed and disburse rld Bank's OED (Graph 3; Svensson 2003) . This is attributed to the incentive schemes of bilateral ors, who disburse funds and allow high volume transfers -irrespective of the quality of programs ollar, Svensson 2000; Svensson 2003). Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that there are large ferences in the reactions to recipient countries' policy implementation. The Nordic countries tend to pond more directly and Japan's aid is "highly correlated with UN voting patterns" (p54) tern of aid is strongly influenced by its interests in the Middle East; " e-third of its total assistance to Egypt and Israel" (Alesina, Dollar 2000 and civil rights sometimes plays a role at the eligibility-stage, and occasionally influences the volume of bilateral aid flows in some countries, but does not exert a consistent influence on actual allocation of aid volu rol Lo typ "en reducing our development assistance as a consequence of the em fro wi Gr alt (U hea (N Go mi wa rig With regard to the Millennium Challenge Account, the reaction in case of non-compliance is refusal by the MCC board to participate in the MCA. Although the selection process is designed to be transparent and objective, the board may deviate from the formal decision criteria and in some cases has done so without explanation. To give an example, in 2004, Georgia was found eligible for MCA funding although it clearly failed to reach several benchmarks in the selection process. This was probably the result of a decision by the board to support Georgia's political transition and then newly electe Lucas, Radelet 2004).
G u
mes by the majority of donors. Personal integrity rights do not generally play a significant e (Neumayer 2003a; 2003b) . oking at individual donors can provide additional insights. The example of Great Britain may be ical, with the Secretary of State for International Development saying that his department deavours not to let the poor suffer by ir government's political choices or shortcomings" (Benn 2007). The British partnership concept phasizes the importance of dialogue, convinced that "conditionality which attempts to 'buy' reform m an unwilling partner has rarely worked" (DFID 2005, p6) . Consequently, when non-compliance th conditionality becomes evident, proportionate and graduated reactions have to be taken. 
Achievement of policy objectives
6.
Wh mo pro 13 er to administer EU regional aid, or the presence of an independent central bank in order to be able join the monetary union (Grabbe 2001). There are, however, no clear benchmarks to measure ective implementing capacity or other conditionality issues (Nicolaides 1999; Dimitrova 2002) . is leaves it open to existing Member States to judge whether candidate countries have met the ditionality requirements. According to Grabbe (2002) this is due to the fact that old Member States d it more important that new Member States can be brought into the Union as equal partners, than t they accurately meet specific conditions. contrast to development aid, the EU not only offers the candidate countries financial benefits but re importantly EU membership, which is perceived to be accompanied by economic development, ional recognition, freedom and political stability (Steunenberg, Dimitrova 2005) .
Compliance with conditionality
ile the implementation of the acquis communautaire has been "a consistent feature" of compliance, re recently rule adoption has increased towards the final stages of accession negotiations, due to the spect of membership becoming increasingly realisable (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004, p679;  e evidence for the effectiveness of bilateral aid on growth is mixe t bilateral aid performs worse than multilateral aid, due to dono 0). On the contrary, Ram (2003) finds an impact of bilateral aid on growth that is not present with ltilateral aid. Rajan and Submarian (2007) suggest that neither bilateral aid nor multilateral aid have impact on growth.
sud and Yontecheva (2005) are among the few who have examined the impact of bilateral aid on erty reduction. They look at improvements of two indicators of the Millennium Development als, namely infant mortality and illiteracy. They find that bilateral aid has no effect on either asud, Yontecheva 2005). B t aid did increase consumption but that this did not benefit the poor.
search by Johnson and Zajonc (2006) on the effects of the Millennium Challenge Account gested that candidate countries that had not yet met the selection criteria, but who were striving to s, performed 25% better on improving policy indicators than a control group of countries. Although is not the case for all indicators or all countries, and the research was limited to data from the first o years of MCA operation, this work provides some evidence that the programm entive for good governance. However, the same research also looked for links between MCA ding and economic growth and found no such links (Johnson, Zajonc 2006) . As longer time rizons may be required for MCA aid to affect economic growth, these results should not be sidered definitive evidence.
Conditionality applied during EU Enlargement
untries that want to join the European Union (EU) have to satisfy several stages of legal and nomic reforms as pre-conditions. This process is supported with capacity building and financial ources.
e EU uses conditionality in order to s s limited to adoption of the acquis communautaire. In the last enlargement round, to includ Eastern European countries, conditionality was expanded to include the 'Copenhagen 1993. The Copenhagen Criteria was complemented in the following years by the uirement that a country has the "ability to take on the obligations of membership including erence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union" (European Council 1993 
6.
Th of law pol Th pro com tic conditionality has been reported to be poor due to the authoritarian nature of some governments. Still, EU conditionality may have contributed to electoral change in these cou nments that finally im 2004). Considering specific Ma wh con to r 14 astricht fiscal policy criteria and acquis rules concerning competition policy and industrial policy, ich restrict the payment of subsidies to loss-making enterprises (i.e. policies to harden soft budget straints), Brücker et al (2005) find that EU enlargement conditionality did help accession countries esolve soft budget constraint problems. mocratic conditionality refers to the fundamental political principles of the European Union, human hts, and liberal democracy. Compliance with democratic conditionality is significantly lower than th acquis condionality (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004) . The lack of clear benchm viously described means it is more difficult to judge whether reforms actually meet the conditions. untries with authoritarian governments, for example Slovakia under the Meciar government, mania in the first half of the 1990s, Croatia under Tudjman, and Serbia under Milosevic, preferred to meet democratic conditionality because of the high political costs of adoption and concerns ut loss of office (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004) .
cording to Grabbe (2001) , the link between fulfilling particular tasks and receiving particular efits is uncertain. This uncertainty is more severe for democratic compliance than for other types of ditionality, for example, compliance under the International Financial Institutions. It has been nd that the conditions of decentralisation and regional development orcement of large decentralising measures in applicant countries in rabbe 2001).
Reaction in case of non-compliance
e most powerful conditionality tool in the EU accession process is the European Union's gatekeeper e; i.e. the ability of the EU to decide which countries can proceed to the next stage towards ession, particularly cific aspects of reform, but rather a "blunt weapon that has to be used j ly" (Grabbe 2001, page number?). The enlargement process has thus bec mitrova 2007).
ere are a multitude of reasons why countries are not permitted to proceed onto further stages of the ession process: In 1997 Slovakia was not allowed to join the first round of negotiations as it was ged not to have met democracy criteria. Specific standards for nuclear power were imposed on lgaria and requirements for economic reform and state orphanages were set in Romania, before her country could join negotiations in 2000 (Grabbe 2001). Croatia's lack of cooperation with the C in The Hague was followed by a delay of its 2003 bid for membership (Steunenberg, Dimitrova 5). Turkey, which received candidate status in 1999, did not start negotiations until October 2005 e to a lack of compli itrova 2007).
Achievement of policy objectives
e policy objective of EU enlargement conditionality is EU rule transfer and the institutionalization these reforms by future Member States. This includes "transposition of EU legislation into domestic , the restructuring of domestic institutions according to EU rules, or the change of domestic itical practices according to EU standards" (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004, p670 ).
e most tangible effect of democratic conditionality has been the introduction of minority rights and tection in accession countries (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004) . However, in general, pliance with democra ntries, and so can claim to have brought in to power the reform-orientated gover plemented democratic reforms (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007) find that EU conditionality is not equally effective throughout the period of preparation for accession. Conditionality decreases sharply as soon as the accession date is set; a tre Qu ob neg their primary foreign policy goal, they usually fast tra par con cer acc ter for ma Th enl of Ge Uk at the structure of domestic institutions explains this variance in com istic institutions and extensive historical legacies in Germany, com the 'so eff
7.
In try coo
Th conditions, alongside devices for monitoring compliance within thes ristics of a conditionality mechanism. From our analysis, the fol estions have been raised about whether EU conditionality actually contradicts its own policy jectives. Applicant countries know that implementation of the acquis communautaire is nonotiable. Since joining the European Union is ck implementation of the acquis. This leads to a lack of debate and very limited involvement of the liament (Dimitrova 2002) . This may result in a democratic deficit, which is contrary to the EU's ditionality policy objective of 'stable democratic institutions'. With regards to decentralisation, tain EU requirements produce incentives and constraints that exclude sub-national actors from the ession process (Grabbe 2001) . Thus, as Schimmelfenning and Sedelmaier (2004) discuss, shortm effectiveness may be partnered with long-term inefficiency, since rule adoption generally means mal transposition into national laws, but implementation and enforcement in everyday policy king is not enforced.
ere is some research that analyses the theoretical model that best explains conditionality in the EU argement process. Checkel has found that in the case of minority rights, as promoted by the Council Europe, the rationalist model of cost/benefit calculations better explains compliance for unified rmany, while the constructivist 'social learning model' fares better in explaining compliance by the raine. The author suggests th pliance mechanisms: plural pared to a transition state with more centralized structures and many "novice" political agents in Ukraine 
Lessons learnt
this section we draw some lessons from the above review of various conditionality mechanisms. We to highlight crucial points that might be taken into consideration when orchestrating south-north peration on climate policy.
Formulation of conditions and evaluation
e formulation and definition of e conditions, are key characte lowing aspects seem to have a major influence on the success of a mechanism: nership periences with IMF and World Bank conditionality suggest that a lack of shared ownership of jects and policies is believed to reduce effectiveness and persistence (Bird, Willett 2004; Checkel 0; IMF 2001b; Khan, Sharma 2003; Leandro et al. 1999 ). Ownership can be achieved when ditions are formulated through dialogue, while a lack of ownership can result from a lack of equity the institutional setting, leading to perceived donor country dominance, amongst other factors.
order to transpar asure a whole range of micro and macro outcomes. Outcomes can include the allocation of targets a specific policy sector, or the act of designating responsibility for the development and plementation of policies and measures. This was the case with IMF conditionality until the 1960s, en it followed macroeconomic policies and used macroeconomic indicators (IMF 2001a) . In the 0s, the IMF started to define conditionality in more detail and added specific measures to the erall targets.
F and World B ulations that the government will do things in certain ways, for example, adopting participatory roaches. This is seen as a way of embedding conditionality more deeply into institutional and litical structures (Koeberle, Malesa 2005) . conditionality is mostly aimed at a country's implementation of certain jurisdiction. The indicator compliance is passing certain laws. This approach is criticized as it does not track the actual plementation and enforcement of such laws (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004) .
Evaluation
The process of monitoring conditionality is not only dependent on the parameters used to indicate com o on the monitoring process and the institution conducting the monitoring. For exa k experience suggests that if staff evaluate their own program success, a lack of ob bec pla the 200
7.
Th conditionality, for example due to the 'Samaritan dilemma' or geo-strategic interests. Reactions in cas ibility of the conditionality me Ta   17 pliance, but als mple, World Ban jectivity may cause them to overestimate program achievements. It has been suggested that this is ause they might not want their lenders to think they have been unable to judge programs in the first ce (Dreher 2004) . Both the difficulty of monitoring, and concern about monitoring failures, reduced response of the IMF and the World Bank to failed programs (Killick 1997; Marchesi, Sabani 7). Independent evaluations of conditionality programs may deliver better results.
Reaction in case of non-compliance
e reaction in case of non-compliance does not always follow the theoretical principles of es of non-compliance have to take into account both the need for cred chanism, and the need for continuity of programs that are pursued. 
Credibility versus continuity
Credibility and continuity are two requirements for a conditionality mechanism which are partly con forcement of conditionality i.e. contingent action in case of s suggested by the conditionality mechanisms reviewed, that when a failure to meet conditions does have an impact on future programs, a lack of credibility arises. In all cases reviewed, this is ociated with overall failur sley et al. 1991; Ramis 1996; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004; Selbervik 1999; Svensson 2000) . ere seems to be some argument for the use of ex-ante conditionality as it has been more cessfully applied both in the contexts of IMF conditionality (Dreher 2004) , and EU Enlargement eunenberg, Dimitrova 2007).
the case of EU enlargement, enforcement is more credible because existing Member States have a ted interest in the compliance of new member countries with the accession criteria because of their n involvement in the EU. In contrast, in bilateral aid programs, conditionality criteria are often iberately weakly formulated and as a result are frequently not enforced.
the one hand credibility plays a key role for the success of a conditionality mechanism, on the er hand it is common sense that continuity and predictability of programs and policies is an portant factor determining the success of cooperation.
Country specifics and institutional setting
e public perception of a mechanism in a country can influence its success. For example, if there is ong opposition against a conditionality mechanism in the donor country, this negatively effects the cess of such a mechanism in the case of the IMF and EU enlargemen F 2001b; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmaier 2004). The same may be true in ecipient countries.
ty-building and long-term relationships
search on the World Bank and EU enlargement conditionality suggests that success is associated th patience from both partners and viable long-term perspectives (Leandro et al. 1999; Steunenberg, mitrova 2005) .
rthermore, from the international institutional level there is often a lack of capacity to design and plement programs suitable for the regional and local level. Bilateral settings may be better suited to plement the subsidiary principle, ider engagement in both countries, which could help to ensure own ports policy consistency.
stitutional setting e institutional setting h sentially, the institutional setting of a cooperative climate policy can either be bilateral, multilateral comprise of both bi-and multilateral elements. When setting up a conditionality mechanism under perative climate policy, the following aspects may be considered: 
Implic
As has been sh of implicit poli tiona gs. bilateral conditionality tends to include 'unofficial conditionality'. Do ie to strategic interests not explicitly formulated in the conditionality. The financial flow thus dependency that is used to exert political pressure. Secondly, conditionality in bilateral settings is likely to gradually extend to include additional policy aspects that may not directly be linked to the ini on of the performance of south-north cooperation on climate policy itse iss 20 lf and may offer impetus for further improvements. Closely linked to the issue of metrics is the ue of 'additionality'. As we know from discussion on the Clean Development Mechanism, e parties involved in cooperation define the conditionality requirements. Each party hopes to ieve something it wants or needs. The question therefore is who needs what in the case of global ustrialized countries fear the consequences of climate change. For them success of climate policy o requires developing countries' contributions to mitigation. Developing countries face more ssing short-term social and economic needs and devote more resources to addressing these mediate needs than to preventing long-term risks and a decrease of living standar mate change. Thus international support is required for the implementation of domestic policies th climate (co-) benefits.
Co
ther party is willing to engage in one-sided activities. However, as the Bali roadmap outlines, ties are willing to engage on the condition of engagement of all other parties. Thus linking ernational support to domestic policies may be the tool for mutual and measurable commitment in th-north cooperation for climate policy.
is may create a strong sense of o mate policy will require equitable participation of all parties involved and therefore will have to pect each country's domestic policy sovereignty -a key precondition for ownership. Secondly, the n interest of industrialised countries in emissions reductions may be higher than their interest in erty reduction in developing countries with traditional development aid. This can increase the mitment of both industrialised and developing cou sistency of the cooperation.
garding the institutional set up, there are benefits of both multilateral and bilateral elements in th-north cooperation on domestic climate policy. Bilateral relationships include country to country peration as well as interaction at the sub-national level. The bilateral setting creates the potential to ble capacity-building, long-term dialogue and development of real partnerships. This could ensure ponsibility and shared ownership and thereby increase effectiveness, stability, and predictability. wever, bilateral settings in general face a bigger risk of falling subject to strategic interests and plicit political conditionality.
contrast, a multilateral setting offers less flexibility to respond to the specific national circumstances requires a large centralised capacity to manage the set of policies required. A suitable combination uld be globally agreed, multilateral frameworks within which bilateral relationships could function. litical conditionality in such a framework could be limited by clearly defining both the objectives of interaction and the scope of conditionality, in order to avoid exploitation of the bilateral ationship. The provision of an independent body for transparent evaluation and review of formance may also be of use. Independent evaluation could protect less powerful parties from itical conditionality, as it would allow the enforcement of clearly specified conditionality criteria evaluation results. e design of south-north cooperation on domestic climate policy needs to balance a reduction in plexity of conditions and the need for country specificity. Coordination by a multilateral body uld also include coordination of the conditions applied, in order to harmonize conditions across ntries.
e UNFCCC framework requires actions to be measured, reported and verified, and therefore raises question of which metrics and indicators can be used in the formulation of cooperation agreements. bust and transparent evidence of policy effects may well increase support for domestic tributions both in the south and in the north. Furthermore, clear metrics create 'objective' evidence policy performance and prevent governments from the north from claiming failure of programs in er to reduce funding as a means to exert internal and external political pressure. Finally, clear trics also allow for evaluati additionality of emissions reductions and policies will be crucial. Therefore effective cooperative climate policy might focus on implementation of more ambitious policies, at larger scale, scope or speed than wo ex-ante conditionality has proved most effective, cooperative climate policy may tie part of eloping countries' domestic policy implementation to the initial disbursement of funds by ustrialized countries -and part of its disbursement to the prior implementation icies or even the achievement of more specific climate or energy indicators. However, this trument has to be balanced with policy persistence and country ownership. Furthermore, the ability the developing country to implement climate and energy policies is a precondition for successful plementation of negotiated policies. Cooperative climate policy must therefore take into account a ntry's institutional capacity for climate policy -and in some cases initially support such institution ilding. rsistence of good policy, i.e. to achieve policy objectives as long as the conditionality mechanism is place, and beyond, must be a central goal of cooperative climate policy. Policy success is related to ntry ownership. Towards this end, mutual social learning, with its softer forms of normal diffusion e dialogue, internal analysis, and negotiation, could be considered as a complement to a purely antitative con e trade-off between continuity of cooperation and stringency of conditionality enforcement requires eful consideration. The two cases need to be considered dependent on the objective of the ernational support. If the international support is aimed directly at the implementation of the policy, n it is clear that it is only required with the successful implementation of the policy and linking is atively simple. However, one objective of climate policy has to be a move towards less carbon ensive products and services. Thus it mi ulating economic activities in new sectors, while domestic policies provide the push away from carbon intensive sectors. Such domestic policies do not create direct costs for the government, but uire support to overcome costs for consumers. The financial support will therefore have to be oted to different policy areas. In this case the resources should not be directed to essential manitarian activities so as to avoid the 'Samaritan dilemma'.
have seen that stringent reactions in cases of non-compliance are essential for the success of a ditionality mechanism. South-north cooperation on domestic climate policy will be most credible ere it is on the agenda of national and international decision makers. In this case a stringent ponse to failures of either party to deliver its part of the deal is more likely to occur and therefore conditionality provisions will be more credible. There is always the risk with conditionality that peration results in an intrusion on domestic issues. It is therefore important to make the mechanism nsparent and to base it on a culture of equity, trust and openness. In this process it will be ticularly important to look more carefully at the institutional settings of climate cooper perspective of industrialised countries. Effective cooperation requires two partners -as illus by Th ada hav tar in dil pro Aft com and Th des her the difficulties and discussions about the governance structure of the Global Environment Facility.
is discussion focused on aspects of mitigation policy. While some of the insights also apply to ptation, this does require a separate discussion to reflect the specificities. For example both parties e an interest in delivering the emissions reductions and might pursue efforts towards ensuring gets are met. In contrast, international cooperation for the support of adaptation measures is mainly the interest of the developing countries that receive support for these measures. Also, the 'Samaritan emma' implies that it is more difficult to abandon cooperation programs on adaptation measures to tect the population of a country than to abandon cooperation on a specific mitigation program. er all, abandoning the cooperation on one mitigation policy increases the credibility of the pliance mechanism for all parties involved and can thus contribute to overall emission reductions policy success.
e conclusions above provide a suggestion of which aspects may be taken into consideration for the ign of a conditionality mechanism in climate policy. This topic has not been discussed extensively e, as this article aims be a starting point for further research, practical work and political dialogue.
Comment [OU1]:
Is this supposed to be developing countries?
